









ABOUT AELP RESEARCH .......................................................................................................5
....................................................................................................................................................5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 6
THE REPORT POSES FOUR MAIN QUESTIONS: ............................................................6
AS A RESULT, THE REPORT MAKES FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS: .............................10
FOREWORDS .........................................................................................................................12
JANE HICKIE ........................................................................................................................12
DAME RUTH SILVER  ...........................................................................................................15
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 18
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE PANDEMIC ............................................................................... 20
3. THE POST-16 SECTOR PRIOR TO THE PANDEMIC .................................................. 25
4. POST-16 SECTOR AUTHORITIES - SOME COMPARISONS ..................................... 35
5. HOW THE SECTOR SAW ITSELF DURING LOCKDOWN .......................................... 38
6. AFTER THE FIRST WAVE … ............................................................................................. 42
7. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF LOCKDOWN? ...................... 46
ANNEX 1: A SURVEY OF SECTOR LEADERS .................................................................... 54
A. DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION (DFE) ....................................................................... 55
B. EDUCATION AND SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY (ESFA) .............................................. 59
C. INSTITUTE FOR APPRENTICESHIPS AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION (IFATE) ...... 63
D. OFSTED ............................................................................................................................. 67
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 70
T H E  A U T H O R4
THE AUTHOR
PAUL WARNER
Paul Warner is Director of Research and Development at AELP. He is an 
expert in work-based learning with nearly 30 years’ experience in the 
sector in a variety of operational and strategic/policy roles. He is a regular 
conference and webinar speaker, and contributor to sector press.
He would like to extend his thanks to colleagues who have read and 
commented on drafts of the survey and this report, and particularly to Dame 
Ruth Silver and the Further Education Trust for Leadership whose support has 
been instrumental in making this report happen.
5
ABOUT FETL
The Further Education Trust for Leadership’s vision is of a further education 
sector that is valued and respected for:
	» Innovating constantly to meet the needs of learners, communities and 
employers
	» Preparing for the long term as well as delivering in the short term; and 
	» Sharing fresh ideas generously and informing practice with knowledge.
ABOUT AELP RESEARCH
AELP Research is a division of the Association of Employment and Learning 
Providers (AELP) dedicated to conducting research activities that are in 
the interests of AELP members and the wider FE sector. AELP is a national 
membership organisation that represents the interests of over 800 
organisations delivering the majority of England’s apprenticeships as well 
as English, maths, study programmes, and other vocational and technical 
qualifications.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report looks at how leadership was demonstrated in the further 
education and skill sector of the UK during the period of the national Covid-
19 lockdown between March and September 2020.
Through a combination of desk research, a survey of sector leaders conducted 
in September 2020, and with reference to other surveys and publications it 
examines in particular how the leadership of four government bodies was 
perceived during this period:
	» The Department for Education (DfE)
	» Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA)
	» The Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (IfATE)
	» Ofsted
Of particular interest was whether or not the actions and decisions they took 
in this period have affected how their authority and leadership is viewed by 
the leaders of sector stakeholder organisations, and whether the relationship 
with them may have altered as a result.
THE REPORT POSES FOUR MAIN QUESTIONS:
1 Did the experience change the nature of the relationship 
between the government, its agencies, and the sector? 
 
These relationships did not appear to fundamentally alter as a result of the 
experience of lockdown. Sector leaders seemed to hold the view that each 
organisation behaved more or less as they might be expected to, with no 
evidence of enhanced collaboration and trust suddenly becoming evident as 
a result of the emergency circumstances.
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2 Did the government’s response – or lack of it – affect 
how their authority is viewed by the sector?
Broadly government and regulators reacted and behaved more or less how 
everyone expected them to react and behave, reflecting some not-unwelcome 
stability in the system. The controversy over A-level exam results made no 
particular difference to overall perceptions, and merely seemed to evidence 
what many in the sector felt they already knew – that government did not 
understand the sector and had been too slow to react to problems.
3 What implications might the sudden shift to widescale 
online learning and remote working have to the way 
further education is thought about and delivered once 
the emergency abates?
A clear theme that emerged was that many in the sector found that they 
were not as far down the path of being ready for online and distance learning 
as they had thought; or at least, that there was further to go to make it a 
viable working proposition than they had appreciated. Some sector leaders 
seemed to express mild surprise at the organisational benefits that rapidly 
accrued from this, with some admitting they had not really given enough 
thought previously to the subject, and leading them to ask (or even berate) 
themselves as to why this was the case. 
4 What thinking needs to be undertaken in terms of 
contingency planning against any future emergency of 
this nature?
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The sector feels that not much worse could happen than the almost complete 
closure of the economy and the effective house arrest of much of the 
population in March 2020. The pressure to adapt and react to this at the time 
was immense but sector leaders feel that on the whole they did the right 
things, acknowledging the role of trade bodies in providing support, guidance 
and an articulation of their views and positions as they did so.
There is however work that needs to be undertaken more widely on 
implementing effective blended learning:
	» The unreadiness of some staff to work with the technology
	» The effect of a lack of personal human contact on motivation and 
engagement
	» The difficulty of replicating practical elements of learning on a remote 
basis
	» The extent of digital deficits amongst learners in terms of connectivity, 
hardware and software
In terms of the individual organisations, DfE in particular was felt not to 
have a clear understanding of the challenges that the sector faced either 
before or during the lockdown, which was also reflected in the actions and 
decisions of the ESFA who were obligated to act on DfE policy instructions. 
IfATE’s relationship with the sector was not ideal before the pandemic with 
stakeholders feeling they were not trusted, a view that persisted through 
lockdown. All three organisations were variously criticised by respondents 
for a slowness of response, though this did not in itself appear to significantly 
affect the ability of sector stakeholders to react appropriately to the 
operational and other challenges with which they were faced in this period.
At the other extreme, Ofsted had been held in high regard by the sector 
prior to lockdown, and during lockdown itself succeeded only in reinforcing 
and even extending this view. This appeared to have much to do with their 
perceived clear sightlines to the issues and challenges that the sector faced, 
possibly because of the high level of former practitioners that Ofsted is 
staffed by.
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The report discusses these findings and relates them to the concept of 
“leaderhood” as expressed by the Further Education Trust for Leadership 
(FETL) 
“ a kind of far-sighted sensitivity to the here-and-now 
challenges faced by your community that transcends the 
task-oriented activity … (and) conveys a deep sense both of 
relatedness and of open-ended, future-focused concern “
(Silver, 2020b). 
It is less clear whether this leaderhood stemmed from a deliberate sense of 
purpose, or whether it was an almost inevitable derivative of the situation, 
but either way its manifestation presents an opportunity for the sector in its 
broadest sense to evaluate its own performance and effectiveness, and to 
use this as the basis of improvement for the future.
The report therefore draws some broad conclusions:
	» That the further education and skills sector was not as prepared for the 
shift to online learning as it had assumed it was
	» That nevertheless it took huge steps to mitigate and these deficiencies 
quickly and effectively wherever it could
	» That the relative lack of trust in the supply side that it felt had been 
demonstrated previously by most agencies of government threatened 
to – but ultimately did not – hold back the ability of the sector to make 
these changes
	» Some residual suspicion remains amongst sector leaders that however 
much they feel they have reacted well and learnt from the experience, 
this will not positively affect the way the sector is governed and 
regulated from above in the future. 
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	» In this respect, DfE and IfATE are felt to have much to learn from the 
actions and response of Ofsted – whilst ESFA appears to have been 
viewed as (to some extent) “apparatchiks”, functionaries of their political 
masters and therefore inevitably bound to reflect the weaknesses o their 
leadership.
AS A RESULT, THE REPORT MAKES FIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1 There is an opportunity for the sector to learn much 
more about itself by properly examining the application 
of leaderhood during lockdown – but for this to have 
benefits across the economy as a whole, government 
and the civil service must be prepared to do likewise. 
Both sides must be honest enough acknowledge any 
shortcomings they may identify as a result, and both 
sides must commit to acting to remedy these in a 
constructive and collaborative fashion.
2 There is little doubt that the sector responded well 
to the lockdown, and this demonstration of ability, 
capacity and leaderhood should be reflected in a shift 
in the perception of the government and its regulators 
towards the sector through increased trust and a better 
appreciation of the impact of their rules on the vast 
majority who try to do the right thing. 
3 The role of mental health in learning and recall needs 
to be better understood by sector practitioners. 
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4 The sector must better embrace the challenges and 
benefits of remote learning technologies more fully 
by understanding the technology better, utilising it in 
their delivery and ensuring that staff and learners have 
the basic tools to be able to make it work for them. 
5 Government must do more to work with the sector to 
ensure that regulation and metrics of performance can 
make these technological opportunities work to the 
best advantage of everybody. 
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FOREWORDS
JANE HICKIE
The publication of these AELP research findings, commissioned by FETL, 
has coincided with a second Covid-related lockdown for England with no 
certainty that it will be a short-term measure.  They have real value in 
offering what lessons can be learnt from the first lockdown to enable as 
much provision in further education and skills to take place over the coming 
weeks in a way that benefits individual learners and the economy.  The 
lessons not only apply to learning providers but also to government and its 
agencies.
It is important to recognise that some of the impacts of a lockdown are 
unavoidable, especially when it comes to learning which takes place in the 
workplace.  For example, there are usually up to half a million apprentices 
gaining new skills on the job and during the summer, the majority of them 
were asked to carry on learning as much as they could remotely; others 
were furloughed with learning still allowed, while hundreds were sadly 
made redundant.  With the furlough scheme now extended, it is hoped that 
thousands more redundancies will be avoided.  The need to reskill adult 
workers, either still in jobs or facing unemployment, was not a new challenge 
during the summer but it suddenly became a much more urgent one. 
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This report highlights the extraordinary and swift response of providers at 
the start of the first lockdown to shift training and assessment online but 
the findings do not present a picture of unadulterated success.  The research 
found that the further education and skills sector was not as prepared for the 
shift to online learning as it had assumed it was and therefore AELP and FETL 
recommend that the sector must better embrace the challenges and benefits 
of remote learning technologies more fully by understanding the technology 
better, utilising it in their delivery and ensuring that staff and learners have the 
basic tools to be able to make it work for them.  From what we are hearing, 
many providers are seeking out external expertise to secure improvements if 
they do not possess it in-house. 
Other areas for providers to address include the effect of a lack of personal 
human contact on motivation and engagement, the difficulty of replicating 
practical elements of learning on a remote basis and the extent of digital 
deficits among learners in terms of connectivity, hardware and software. 
Furthermore mental health is increasingly seen as potentially altering the 
whole ability of someone to learn, and to recall what they have previously 
learnt.
We should not underestimate the impact of the ‘digital divide’ on 
disadvantaged learners and this has been starkly illustrated in the debate 
over whether it was wise to stop at the end of July the Covid-related rule 
flexibility which allowed teacher assessed results for functional skills tests.  As 
the pandemic goes on, it is reasonable to ask whether other rule flexibilities 
should continue beyond their planned end dates.
As the reports explains, it took a long time before some of the 36 flexibilities, 
which were requested by AELP at the beginning of the lockdown to maintain 
as much learning as possible, were introduced and often in the absence of 
relevant guidance, our advice to member providers was simply ‘to do what’s 
best for the learner’.  Frustration with the slowness of the regulators’ response 
was reflected in the interviews conducted for the research.   
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The sector leaders felt that a long held lack of trust in providers lay behind the 
delays and therefore the slowness did not come as a surprise.  Only Ofsted 
has escaped criticism in this respect. 
It is too soon to say whether leaders’ perceptions of the government’s 
understanding of the sector have improved since the research was 
undertaken but it is vital that policymakers’ understanding of the challenges 
facing providers is on a sound footing.  At AELP, we have been encouraged by 
the ESFA statement on collaboration, communication and clarity which was 
issued in late June 2020 and there are definitely signs that the commitments 
are being backed up by deeds.  Similarly, IfATE is listening to what we have to 
say on the funding of apprenticeship standards and DfE officials are willing to 
consult in confidence on policy changes.
These improvements do not detract from the need to give this report a full 
read.  The continuation of the pandemic means that mistakes made the 
first time around are not repeated.  We cannot afford to let employers and 
learners down in terms of trying to reduce the negative impact of Covid and 
supporting an economic recovery when it starts.
Jane Hickie
Managing Director
Association of Employment and Learning Providers         
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DAME RUTH SILVER 
The Covid-19 pandemic has asked difficult questions of us all, and nowhere 
more than in the education sector.
The obvious – and very important – story here is one of disruption and 
resilience, the capacity to adapt, among both staff and students, and the 
bravery and diligence of frontline workers. But the pandemic is also having 
a profound impact on how we think and feel about our roles and functions 
within the further education sector, as well as on how we conceptualise the 
sector’s wider purpose, and our own place in delivering and upholding that.
This is fascinating and largely unexplored territory, which is why the Further 
Education Trust for Leadership (FETL) was keen to support the Association of 
Employment and Learning Providers (AELP) in this ambitious and timely study 
of the impact of the Covid crisis on the sector and, in particular, its effect 
on relationships and the authorities that underpin them. It is particularly 
important that we look beyond colleges and focus equally on the impact on 
independent providers in this. Too often, in our reflections about the sector, 
our gaze is splintered and our stories incomplete.
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The impact of the pandemic on further education and skills is a hugely 
important topic, and I was personally very pleased that the AELP chose to 
focus the study, in part, on authorities and relationships. My own impression 
is that a new authority and confidence has indeed arisen among staff as 
they have striven to undertake both their everyday responsibilities and new 
complexities in facing and handling the crisis.  In the process, new spaces were 
created in which agency could be exercised, effectively dispersing leadership 
to a greater extent than before within organisations.
This is true at the level of frontline staff, but also, I think, at the level of 
institutional leadership, where gaps in national leadership, perhaps inevitable 
in such fast-changing circumstances, have had to be filled in creative and 
enterprising ways at the level of the senior leadership team or even in 
workshops and classrooms (or virtual equivalents). A wider expression of this 
shift can be identified in the increasing tension between local and national 
leadership, which is again challenging long-standing ways of doing things in 
the UK (notably, the over-centralised nature of our politics and our tolerance 
of inequality), while laying bare some of the realities and limitations of the 
localism agenda.
Of course, it is far from clear what trends will stick and how things will 
further develop, against the backdrop of continuing lockdowns and economic 
uncertainty. But it is critical that we begin asking the questions now. This 
report begins that learning process by sharing what our colleagues have to say 
about the challenges they have encountered and how they have faced them. 
The report offers strong insight and opinions on this, showing, among other 
things, how, not for the first time, the most profound impact in education and 
training has been felt on the frontline.
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We are still learning, and there is much more work to be done to understand 
fully the impact of the pandemic on further education. It is clear already, 
however, that some perceptions are changing, not least about the potential 
of technology in teaching and learning (and the capacities of providers to 
adapt), the nature of leadership within organisations and the importance of 
trust and agency, and the relationship between learning and inequality. We 
will be sifting through this for some time. But we must begin, as this study 
does, by listening and understanding the impact on the ground.
Dame Ruth Silver
President 
Further Education Trust for Leadership
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1. INTRODUCTION
“ From this evening, I must give the British people a very 
simple instruction – you must stay at home ”
UK Prime Minister Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP;  
live televised address to the nation, 23rd March 2020
This “very simple instruction” marked the beginning of an unprecedented 
national crisis; an almost complete shutdown of the UK economy to prevent 
the spread of a new and deadly respiratory virus for which there was no 
treatment or cure.
Unsurprisingly, instructions that start out as “very simple” can ultimately 
impact in very many complex and usually unforeseen ways. It therefore soon 
became apparent that the stay-home instruction was wreaking extensive 
damage to lifestyles, livelihoods and the economy as a whole. A balance had 
to be reached between keeping people safe from the virus but maintaining a 
degree of normal life to enable the economy and 21st-century life to resume 
and continue. The population looked to government and its agencies for 
leadership, largely accepting that under such unprecedented and monumental 
pressures some mistakes may be made, but being prepared to work with this 
if, on balance, they trusted the competence and integrity of those in charge.
This piece looks at how this position of leadership translated into the further 
education and vocational skills sector – how it impacted on provision, and 
how the leaders of these organisations viewed the instructions and guidance 
they were being given. Lockdown presaged for example a sudden shift to 
online and remote working of both staff and learners, with providers trying 
to keep learning alive whilst trying to accommodate the cancellation of 
examinations, fast-paced changes in regulation and the closure of places 
of work and learning. This was overshadowed by not only the unfamiliar 
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pressures of learners learning remotely via teachers and trainers who were 
similarly working from home, but the lingering threat of staff furloughs, 
redundancies, or complete company closures – maybe even their own. 
This work therefore examines whether in this arena, the government is seen 
to have had a “good pandemic”. Our aim was to explore four questions:
1 Did the experience change the nature of the relationship 
between the government, its agencies, and the sector? 
2 Did the government’s response – or lack of it – affect 
how their authority is viewed by the sector?
3 What implications might the sudden shift to widescale 
online learning and remote working have to the way 
further education is thought about and delivered once 
the emergency abates?
4 What thinking needs to be undertaken in terms of 
contingency planning against any future emergency of 
this nature?
With the support of the Further Education Trust for Leadership (FETL), AELP 
was able to undertake extensive desk research into the timeline of the virus 
and the correlation with departmental and sector announcements and 
responses: to examine evidence of previous pandemic situations to see 
how national economies had responded and how/whether our sector had 
been affected in similar ways; to analyse and following up on responses to a 
comprehensive survey of sector leaders that examined how their organisations 
adapted to the situation; and examine whether the government’s handling of 
the pandemic had affected thinking and relationships going forward. All this 
has come together to inform the findings of this report.
2 .  T H E  O R I G I N S  O F  T H E  P A N D E M I C2 0
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE PANDEMIC
The response of the post-16 sector must be understood in the context of the 
pandemic and lockdown as a whole. Individual leaders within the sector will 
have been influenced in their reaction to sector-specific developments and 
their subsequent decision-making by their own wider perceptions of how 
the situation was being handled by the government and by the nation as a 
whole. This chapter therefore gives a brief overview of the progress of the 
disease in the UK up until the point of lockdown on March 23rd 2020, giving 
a backdrop to how sector leaders responded to government thereafter.
The first known human infections of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-
19) were in Wuhan, China in late 2019, with the earliest symptom onsets 
becoming evident on 1st December (Wu et al, 2020: 217-220). By the 30th 
January 2020 the outbreak was severe enough to be classed as a ‘public health 
emergency of international concern’ by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
– a definition that is a last-resort call to action necessitating an immediate 
international response. By the 11th March, the WHO had officially declared a 
pandemic, with their Director-General declaring, “We are deeply concerned 
both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the alarming levels 
of inaction….. Some countries are struggling with a lack of capacity. Some 
countries are struggling with a lack of resources. Some countries are struggling 
with a lack of resolve.” (WHO, 2020)
On the same day in Britain, Chancellor Rishi Sunak was announcing his annual 
budget, which included £30bn in measures designed to protect the economy 
from the virus (Schomberg et al, 2020). This level of financial commitment was 
designed to show how seriously the government was taking the prospect of 
the virus, as there was some disquiet already evident that the government’s 
response did not appear to align with the emerging evidence of the virus 
taking a serious and deadly hold in Italy and Spain in particular. On the 3rd 
March government had published an action plan to mitigate against the virus 
(UK Government, 2020) that warned that up to 20% of the workforce could 
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be absent from work as a result of it. Yet on the same day, the Prime Minister 
publicly joked that he was still shaking hands with everyone, including at a 
hospital treating coronavirus patients (Grey and Macaskill, 2020) adding “I 
want to stress that for the vast majority of the people of this country, we 
should be going about our business as usual.” (UK Government, 2020b).
This approach was however coming under increasing pressure very quickly. 
On the 12th March ITV’s Robert Peston reported that the government’s 
strategy was “to allow the virus to pass through the entire population so 
that we acquire herd immunity” (Peston, 2020) despite findings from models 
run by Imperial College which claimed that such a strategy could result in 
hundreds of thousands of deaths (Calvert et al, 2020). Although it was denied 
subsequently that the concept of achieving herd immunity through a 60% 
rate of infection was ever government policy, the report by Robert Peston and 
the government’s slowness to clarify comments by the government’s Chief 
Scientific Adviser (that were intended to say that herd immunity might be a 
consequence of the pandemic rather than a deliberately achieved objective), 
succeeded merely in sowing anxiety and confusion further (Yong, 2020).
 
The speed and spread of the outbreak were undoubtedly a factor in some of 
the mixed messaging that appeared to be coming from government at this 
time. Only five days after the budget, on the 16th March, the Department 
for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport issued official guidance in which “it is 
advised that large gatherings should not take place”(UK Government, 2020c) 
even though there had been no moves to cancel the Cheltenham festival in 
the previous few days which around 250,000 had attended and which was 
later suspected of being a “super-spreader” event (Bedingfield, 2020). 
On the 18th March, the government told NHS hospitals to move their 
elderly patients into care homes even if they had tested positive for Covid-
19, a move that would generate extensive controversy in months to come1. 
1   Bill Hanage, a British infectious-disease epidemiologist based at Harvard University asked at the 
time, “Who do you think works at those nursing homes? Highly trained gibbons? … It’s the people 
who are in that exact age group you are expecting to be infectious.” (Yong, 2020).
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On the same day there was a significant announcement from the Department 
of Education (DfE) that all schools, colleges and early years settings would shut 
from the afternoon of the 20th March until further notice to all children except 
those of key workers and other vulnerable children, and that all examinations 
scheduled for the summer were to be cancelled (UK Government, 2020d). On 
the 20th March further guidance came out from DfE regarding the awarding 
of grades for cancelled exams which would in August prove to be at the heart 
of another contentious and controversial episode in the pandemic:
“(We must ensure that) GCSE, A and AS level students are 
awarded a grade which fairly reflects the work that they 
have put in. There will also be an option to sit an exam 
early in the next academic year for students who wish to. 
Ofqual will develop and set out a process that will provide 
a calculated grade to each student which reflects their 
performance as fairly as possible, and will work with the 
exam boards to ensure this is consistently applied for all 
students. The exam boards will be asking teachers, who 
know their students well, to submit their judgement about 
the grade that they believe the student would have received 
if exams had gone ahead ” 
(UK Government, 2020e) 
As both infection rates and the death toll began to accelerate, on the 20th 
March the Prime Minister ordered all cafes, pubs and restaurants to close 
that evening, with nightclubs, theatres, cinemas and gyms closing “as soon 
as they reasonably can.” (BBC, 2020). But it was not enough - three days 
later, on Monday 23rd March, the Prime Minister Boris Johnson went on 
live television across the nation to take a step that even three weeks before 
had seemed impossible to imagine – to instruct the public to stay at home 
except for certain “very limited purposes” – shopping for essential items 
(such as food and medicine); one form of outdoor exercise each day (such 
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as running, walking or cycling), either alone or with others who live in the 
same household; for any medical need, or to provide care to a vulnerable 
person; and to travel to and from work only where “absolutely necessary” 
and the work in question could not be done from home. Furthermore, all 
non-essential shops, libraries, places of worship, playgrounds and outdoor 
gyms were closed, and police given powers of enforcement, including the use 
of fines. (BBC, 2020). 
Dateline of European counter-Covid measures
Source: Imperial College, 2020
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It is important to note that despite the unprecedented nature of the lockdown2 
it was still not as extensive as had taken place in many other countries, 
avoiding for example curfews or travel bans. and generally imposing counter-
Covid measures later than most of its European neighbours. Furthermore, 
the government did not trigger the Civil Contingencies Act, designed for the 
most serious emergencies. As UK daily deaths from the pandemic peaked 
at 1,166 on 21st April, (Worldometer, 2020) the feeling that the coronavirus 
presented an unprecedented threat to our way of life and that there would 
not be a quick or easy resumption of normality was taking a firm hold. 
Whether all this amounts to a positive response or not is not the subject of this 
paper, but it is important to note as context for the way that the population 
– and FE sector leaders in particular – reacted. The post-16 sector, along with 
everyone else, found itself in a position it had never faced before – their 
facilities were shut to everyone (except vulnerable children and those of key 
workers), with the vast majority of learning having to take place over digital 
platforms using content and curriculum that in many cases had not been 
designed with this primary use in mind. Examinations had been cancelled but 
there was (as yet) no detail on how learners would receive grades for their 
studies. The vast majority of the post-16 workforce suddenly and instantly 
found themselves working from home, having to balance the demands of 
home life and the new and very unfamiliar working situation that had been 
imposed upon them. 
And for sector leaders, there was another huge issue that came to the fore 
instantly – how would their companies survive? If employer businesses were 
shut, could work-based and work-related learning even take place? And if not, 
would this mean the funding dried up, and with it the prospects of survival 
for many in the sector already under pressure from the constrained public 
finances of the previous decade?
2   Even during the flu pandemic of 1918/19 that killed around 50m people globally, UK schools were 
not ordered to close by government (Arnold, 2020), whilst the 1957 flu pandemic which at its peak 
was killing 600 a week in Britain was described by the Junior Health Minister of the time merely as “a 
heaven-sent topic for the press during the ‘silly season’.” (Honigsbaum, 2020)
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3. THE POST-16 SECTOR PRIOR TO 
THE PANDEMIC
A trade press review of 2019 (FE Week, 2019) gives a good general 
impression of the major issues that had been concerning the sector prior 
to the advent of the coronavirus crisis. There was ongoing concern about 
funding, particularly with regard to the finances of colleges, many of which 
appeared to one extent or another to be experiencing serious deficit 
difficulties – Hadlow College had in May 2019 become the first college to 
be put into administration and it was reported that Bradford College had 
skirted perilously close to it.
Of most interest however was how the new Conservative government under 
Boris Johnson, elected with a 76-seat majority on December 12th, would treat 
the sector. It was well known that T Levels – new technical qualifications at 
Level 3 aimed primarily at 16-18 year olds – would be launching in September 
2020, the design and the timetable for which were both subjects of concern, 
not least because of the integral need for every learner to undertake an 
extended “industry placement”, presenting a number of challenges for the 
sector which had not yet been satisfactorily resolved (AELP, 2018). There had 
also been promises of a £600m/year National Skills Fund creating a “right to 
retrain”, details for which were being eagerly awaited as to what this might 
mean in practice. The former Chancellor, Sajid Javid, had also put an extra 
£400m into provision for 16-18 year old learners.
However, what was missing from the Conservative election manifesto was 
a solution to the emerging budget issues that had become evident since 
the introduction of the apprenticeship levy in 2017, or any indication of 
a new numerical starts target for it. Indeed, the levy – a 0.5% payroll tax 
imposed on companies with paybills of over £3m p.a. ringfenced to pay for 
apprenticeship training – had dominated debate in the sector for some years 
prior to 2020, as it overhauled the system in every respect including content, 
design, implementation, funding and delivery. 
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The policy narrative behind this radical overhaul led with the concept of 
“employers in the driving seat” (Warner and Gladding, 2018) – that the 
vocational skills sector had for too long been driven by the supply side instead 
of paying proper regard to the needs of employers, leading to a plethora of 
relatively poor quality apprenticeships that did not meet the needs of the 
business and the UK economy. The policy was underpinned by a high-profile 
manifesto commitment in 2015 by the Conservative Party to achieve 3m 
apprenticeship starts by 2020 if elected (Conservative Party, 2015: 18). 
Apprenticeships had therefore been the pre-eminent item on the post-
16 agenda for some years prior to 2020. The government had consistently 
championed their “gold standard” nature and significant amounts of financial 
and political capital had been expended on ensuring the launch of the levy, 
and the apprenticeship programme in general, was a success. Despite 
this, apprenticeship starts under the apprenticeship levy system were 
disappointing, with a significant fall in the first year of the levy’s operation 
(2017/18) and only small increases thereafter; 
Source: (UK Parliament, 2020)
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In March 2020, just before lockdown, the latest figures for apprenticeship 
starts were arguably staging a small comeback; 198,600 starts in the previous 
quarter was 2.3% up on the previous year (UK Government, 2020f), but still 
considerably down on the equivalent figure for the year before the levy was 
introduced of 251,500 (UK Government, 2016). It had not gone unnoticed 
by the sector that over the intervening period, mention of the 3m target 
had grown steadily less frequent, before apparently being quietly dropped 
in August 2018 (Burke, 2018). Apprenticeships were mentioned only five 
times in the entire Conservative manifesto of 2019, and even then without 
any commitment to how many might be created in the next Parliament 
(Conservative Party, 2019).
Particularly in the early days of the levy and its planning, the sector felt it had 
been inadequately consulted about changes that could be fundamental to its 
very future (Robertson, 2016). Many providers felt they had been “blamed” for 
an apparent lack of quality and relevance in apprenticeships prior to the levy, 
even though the government’s own research had demonstrated no particular 
level of employer dissatisfaction with what already existed (AELP, 2014 / UK 
Government, 2014a / UK Government 2014b).  The restructuring of funding 
had additionally led to an influx of new providers into the market, many of 
questionable quality, which gave rise to concerns that even the exhortations of 
“high quality” apprenticeship provision had been sacrificed in the ultimately 
unsuccessful race to reach an arbitrary start target of 3m apprenticeships 
that appeared to bear no relation to labour market information3. 
3  Former Skills Minister Nick Boles has admitted the 3m figure was fairly arbitrary. In an 
interview with the Institute for Government in November 2017 he said, “We had delivered two 
million apprenticeships in the 2010–15 parliament, so in the manifesto process, there was a classic 
exercise in ‘well, okay, what are we going to promise for the next parliament? … There was this 
feeling that you can’t say two-and-a-half million – that sounds a bit tame, nobody would be excited 
by that – so we’re going to say three million. Then three million is really a lot of apprenticeships, it’s 
big growth.” (Thornton and Kidney-Bishop, 2017)  
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There were also abiding concerns with the opaque process for setting funding 
rates for apprenticeships, with the major apprenticeship trade the Association 
of Employment and Learning Providers (AELP) being particularly vocal in its 
criticism of the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (IfATE) 
for a perceived failure to give sufficient funding for some critical apprenticeship 
standards (AELP, 2019) , whilst simultaneously dismissing employer demands 
for others to be created (Camden, 2020).
An additional external “macro” pressure was the long-running “Brexit” process 
of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, which in many (if not most) 
commentators’ minds was actually the single most important issue of the 
2019 General Election by some margin despite the matter having apparently 
been decided by a referendum in 2016. There was considerable debate still 
happening as to whether the withdrawal as a whole, and the arrangements 
which would govern how trade and the economy would operate afterwards in 
particular, would benefit the economy or not, and in what timespan. Of more 
immediate concern to the post-16 sector was that whichever way the debate 
was cut, there would be a need for the training infrastructure to produce far 
more workers with intermediate skills in particular than was currently the 
case.  Given that apprenticeship start numbers had dropped significantly over 
the last two years and were only struggling to regain even a semblance of 
the momentum they once had, there was a feeling that providers might once 
again be being lined up to be the fall guys for any perceived failure of policy.
The sector was therefore feeling under pressure. FETL (2020) have articulated 
some of the general pressure on sector leaders at this time that all this was 
contributing to; “a culture of constant reform, (combining) extreme financial 
constraint and high expectations (with an) overbearing , sometimes unfair, 
system of accountability.” It described the genuine concern amongst leaders 
that regulation and intervention was “operating in a punitive way, aiming to 
demonstrate accountability through changes in leadership more than it is 
focused on improving learner outcomes”.
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Stephen Exley (2020) has also looked at the experiences of leaders of a 
number of governing and regulatory bodies, quoting one CEO complaining 
of a pervasive blame culture that threatened sometimes to destroy careers; 
“They made that decision at the time with the information available and 
thought it was the right thing to do. If we don’t let people learn from their 
mistakes then we’re never as a sector going to move on.” Exley says that 
whilst the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) claimed to “hold 
providers to account for their performance to ensure (that they) consistently 
raise standards”, that Ofsted aimed “to be a force for improvement through 
our inspections”, and that regulators were united in a desire to make things 
better, sector leaders felt that increasingly the effect that they were having 
was precisely the opposite.
At the same time, many sector leaders could not absolve themselves entirely 
from some of the system deficiencies and pressures that lockdown brought 
into stark relief. The immediate requirement to shift to remote learning 
surprisingly seemed to catch a number of providers out, even though blended 
learning was already widely recognised option for learning delivery across 
the sector. As Crowther (2020) has pointed out,
“ an immediate and critical issue … was the move to remote 
learning, which was fairly predictable given the nature of 
the pandemic … This all too often revealed longer-term 
under-investment in digital infrastructure, resources and 
digital skills and was compounded by (an) inconsistency in 
approach across the system, which for staff at times added 
up to the impression of making it up as you go along ”
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This view was also reflected in a comment by a sector leader on how provider 
business processes had coped during lockdown, saying:
“ A decision was made by management a number of years 
ago to withdraw any IT support or renew equipment and it 
has made the job in hand at the moment very challenging ” 
(Warner, 2020). 
The economic impact of the lockdown was a primary and immediate concern 
for all in the sector and of course well beyond, with GDP having shrunk by 




Although there was a small recovery in GDP as lockdown restrictions began 
to ease, many of the full effects were inevitably only going to be seen in the 
longer term, with a significant increase in youth unemployment becoming 









































































































































































































Change in employment numbers by age group 
Source: (ONS, 2020b)
After what some felt was a slow start at the beginning of the outbreak to 
appreciate its potential seriousness, the government’s response to support 
business and the economy in the first days of lockdown had been sweeping, 
substantial and relatively comprehensive. On the 20th March Chancellor 
Rishi Sunak announced that government would support 80% of wages for 
individuals placed on furlough in order to protect against mass redundancies, 
which was launched as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme in April. (UK 
Government, 2020g). A Self-Employment Income Support Scheme also 
offered some support to the self-employed (UK Government, 2020h).
Of specific interest to the post-16 sector was however Procurement Policy 
Note 02/20 from the Cabinet Office, published on the 20th March (UK 
Government, 2020i). This set out that public “contracting authorities must 
act now to ensure suppliers at risk are in a position to resume normal 
contract delivery once the outbreak is over” by “urgently review(ing) their 
contract portfolio and inform(ing) suppliers they believe are at risk that they 
will continue to be paid as normal even if service delivery is disrupted or 
temporarily suspended) until at least the end of June”. 
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Combined with the Chancellor’s announcement on the 16th April that  “I want 
to ensure that no viable business slips through our safety net of support as we 
help protect jobs and the economy”, this on the surface appeared to be the 
welcome news that providers accessing public funds for work-based or work-
related vocational learners would continue to receive their payments even 
if the learners had been furloughed or were otherwise unable to continue 
(even temporarily) with their studies. 
However, it soon became evident that the relief scheme was not intended 
to cover payments from the apprenticeship levy, which the DfE considered 
to be a contract between the employer and the provider, and not with 
the government. This provoked a furious reaction from trade bodies and 
providers alike, who had not long previously been lauded for their compliance 
with exhortations from government to shift their business to levy-funded 
apprenticeships, only to find that having done so they would now get no 
help where others who had not made these moves, would. With apprentices 
amongst the first to be furloughed or made redundant, the prospects for 
these providers seemed bleak. 
There was also confusion for some time about whether or not furloughed 
apprentices could continue to be trained or not, despite providers pointing 
out that furlough presented a strong opportunity to maintain learning 
engagement and would maintain an income for them at no unplanned cost. 
When this was finally clarified (after threats of legal action and strident 
demands from the sector) it at least facilitated some short-term prospects of 
survival, though the longer-term still presented a problem – as some of these 
apprentices continued their studies to completion, they stopped generating 
an income and with starts down to something like 25% of their normal rate 
for this time of year, there was no new business coming in to generate a 
continuing source of income. 
DfE and its agencies also undertook relatively rapid variations to delivery 
rules to facilitate continuing learning delivery amidst the national restrictions 
on travel and social distancing requirements of lockdown. The ESFA offered 
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early provisions on the 23rd March (the day lockdown was announced) that 
relaxed some requirements for training and assessment (IfATE, 2020), with 
Ofsted having suspended all routine assessments a few days earlier. Fuller 
guidance came from DfE with an announcement of the suspension  of 
performance-based data for 2020 on the 8th April (UK Government, 2020l) 
and the cancellation of “all but the most essential data collections” for 
educational and care settings on the 22nd (ESFA, 2020).
It is notable then that repeated surveys of the provider base as the 
summer ended revealed some evidence of very cautious optimism about 
their prospects going forward. Whilst just over 38% of AELP respondents 
(2020) were confident they could regain previous levels of business in the 
following six months – not at all unsatisfactory in light of the turmoil many 
had just been through -  this figure rose significantly to over 60% when they 
were asked for their confidence in a longer than 6 month period. This was 
backed by a delegate poll at AELP’s online Business Recovery Conference on 
September 10th at which delegates were asked, “At what level of pre-lockdown 
programme capacity/delivery do you anticipate your business operating in 12 
months’ time?”; 69% of respondents replied that they could return to at least 
three-quarters of previous levels of business, and 32% felt confident enough 
to predict 90-100%. It seemed that there was a feeling that if providers could 
just survive the titanic pressures of lockdown, there was enough resilience in 
the economy and amongst employers to see a recovery take place over the 
medium to longer term. 
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Source: (AELP) 
This then is the backdrop that informs the view of sector leaders as to how 
the various government departments and agencies performed during the 
pandemic – whether they felt the actions taken were sufficient and timely 
enough to allow them to ride out the crashing waves of lockdown, or whether 
there had been deficiencies in what was undertaken and when. We now move 
on to discuss the specific performance of the four major government bodies – 
what their relationship with the sector was like prior to the pandemic; during 
it; and how they were perceived afterwards.
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4. POST-16 SECTOR AUTHORITIES - 
SOME COMPARISONS
In this section we look at the results of our survey to elicit direct comparisons 
between the various government bodies to better understand the sector’s 
overall viewpoint. In September 2020 AELP published a survey to which 53 
sector leaders from (mostly) independent rtraining probviders responded. 
A number of these were subsequently spoken to in order to clarify or 
amplify their responses.
 
Agreement with this statement for DfE, ESFA and IfATE were broadly of the 
same magnitude (26% to 34%) but it is striking how much more positive the 
view of Ofsted was in this regard amongst sector leaders. On balance, of all 
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"They generally trusted stakeholders to do the 
right thing" - likelihood in future









When asked about the prospects of trust of stakeholders in future,. Ofsted 
once again scored highly with 72% once again agreeing but more of these 
now in the “Strongly agreeing” category. However, the proportions of 
those agreeing with the statement for the other three organisations all fell. 
Another key point of comparison is the understanding that the various bodies 
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"They understood the challenges the sector faced 
(during lockdown)"










The picture as a whole tends to suggest however that the sector did not 
feel that during the period of lockdown that government in general really 
understood the situation in which the sector found itself. Over 60% felt 
that DfE lacked that understanding with ESFA not far behind in this respect. 
Respondents were more split on the ESFA however with very similar levels of 
agreement and disagreement.
That said, the level of understanding that the sector felt Ofsted had is 
remarkable, with 80% agreeing with the proposition, which may go some way 
to explaining the overall view of whether or not each organisation had what 













Yes No To some extent Don't know
"Overall, did these organisa�ons respond effec�vely to 
the pandemic and lockdown?"
DfE ESFA IfATE Ofsted
A comparison across all three organisations therefore brings all responses 
and comments into sharp relief: Ofsted were overwhelmingly felt by our 
respondents to have responded effectively to the Covid emergency, probably 
through having an understanding of the sector that DfE and the others 
appeared to lack.
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5. HOW THE SECTOR SAW ITSELF 
DURING LOCKDOWN
Respondents to our survey indicated that broadly they felt they had done 
the right things at the right time despite the effect (to one extent or another) 
of the actions or omissions of the various sector authorities.
A major outcome from lockdown was the shifting of learning delivery 
operations almost entirely online at incredible speed. Even as early as April 
2020, Pember and Corney (2020) wrote that “after years of trying to nudge 
educators into using technology, a gargantuan shift has been achieved in just 
three weeks.” So far at least, the sector appears to have achieved this with no 
apparent serious adverse impact on the morale of their staff or learners, as 
evidenced by AELP/Bud (2020):
 
Source: AELP/Bud (2020)
The same survey even found that many organisations could identify clear 
benefits on their operational effectiveness that had stemmed from the 
actions they had to take during lockdown:
Less engaged
24%





Learner response to remote delivery
Less engaged No change in engagement More engaged
Dislike it
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Staff response to remote 
working / delivery
Dislike it Neither +ve or -ve Like it
   
Operationally therefore – and with the strong caveat of an assumption that 
sector organisations had been able to financially survive lockdown – the 
sector managed a period of huge change well. This happened, as we have 
seen, against a background of what was generally perceived by them to be a 
rather slow response from the sector authorities (with the notable exception 
of Ofsted), despite which the sector still seemed to have made the right 
decisions for itself, taken the right actions, and as a result crucially maintained 
and even improved provision in the eyes of both their staff and their learners. 
Certainly, the survey conducted for this report showed respondents to be 



























Effect of lockdown on delivery








0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
I felt I performed be�er than I might have expected
I felt I performed as well as I had expected
I felt I performed less well than I had expected
Lockdown posed leadership challenges I had not
expected or had not preivously encountered
My staff generally rose to the challenges presented
It highlighted exis�ng strengths in my staff
It highlighted exis�ng weaknesses in my staff
How did your experience during lockdown affect your role as a 
leader in your organisa�on?
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Key to where the sector is now therefore is not to lose this insight – if lockdown 
highlighted existing weaknesses in staff for 61% of respondents, what actions 
will it now take to remediate those weaknesses? If lockdown posed new and 
unexpected leadership challenges, what were they – how did we react to 
them – and what actions are being taken to ensure that should they happen 
again, others can learn from those experiences and they are not just lost to 
memory? 
One strong theme that clearly emerges from not just this study but others, 
is that the great acceleration of the move to online vocational learning is 
likely to be a major legacy of the experience for the sector as a whole. Clearly 
this move was already happening, but a number of respondents to our 
survey made clear that the pandemic had nevertheless highlighted in one 
way or another how relatively ill-prepared they were, when previously they 
thought they had been adapting to the new online world in a progressive and 
satisfactory way. When asked, “Knowing what you know now, what if anything 
would you have done differently (during lockdown)?” the answers were 
almost exclusively about preparation for a shift to online learning: for example 
“Have more knowledge about what learners are able to 
access from home-laptops, PCs, internet issues ”
“Prepared staff for remote delivery by accessing external 
training for them on digital learning. ”
“Ensure that all staff and learners had suitable internet 
and IT equipment  Researched more free online courses. 
Delivered  training on google teams/skype, ensure all staff 
have good IT skills ”
None of them indicated that there was anything they felt they could have 
done differently about how they handled their relationships with government 
and its agencies, but many commented on the fact that the experience had 
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exposed the gap between their own reality of the sector and how it appeared 
to have been perceived by the authorities:
 
“what is clear is that in my opinion most are so far away 
from what is happening in the market that changes are 
needed ”
“they have very little understanding of hands on education 
and training and draw from experiences of their own 
academic education that do not reflect the apprenticeship 
or vocational sector ”
At the same time, there was a clear feeling that the only way things would get 
better was by working together:
“Happy to talk, be consulted, have off-the-record discussions 
to help improve understanding. ”
“We will continue to fully interact as we did prior to lockdown 
and hope the interaction is reciprocated ”
In some ways it is of course to be expected that respondents might err to 
the positive in making judgements on their own performance, so we are 
not claiming these results to be the definitive or authoritative view of how 
things actually were. They do however give a good insight into the way that 
sector leaders thought and reacted, and given the inescapable evidence of 
a positive shift to online learning, of an improvement in some aspects of 
business operation, and of the mere fact that the majority of such businesses 
survived what may be accurately described as a catastrophic drop in national 
economic productivity, there is reason to think that at least the essence of 
their responses has some verity about it. 
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6. AFTER THE FIRST WAVE …
Earlier we looked at the issues that were at the top of the sector’s mind 
before lockdown started. As  2020 began there were some technical and 
sector-specific issues such as the finances of the college sector, but in 
general FE as a whole was still digesting and ruminating on how the new 
Conservative government may treat it, picking apart the 2019 manifesto 
and cross-referencing it to announcements  from the new Cabinet. Then 
almost overnight, the old order was effectively torn up and replaced by a 
deck of almost entirely new questions that had to be answered immediately 
in the context of an unprecedented national emergency.
The sector responded well however; it is already being used as an exemplar 
to the schools and higher education sectors as to how best education can 
respond and prepare to events of this nature in future. That is a function of, 
and derives from, effective leadership. In this respect it is therefore useful to 





Compared to the period pre-pandemic, is your organisa�on now 
be�er prepared to respond and maintain delivery in the event of a 
second wave or lockdown?
Yes No
What comes over from the data in this piece of work is that respondents 
felt that they had moved a long way from where they started, and that if it 
happened again they would be much better placed to react and continue 
to provide learning services with minimal disruption. One sector leader was 
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quoted as saying “having developed protocols and capability we could now 
switch within a working week to fully support learners if we were required to 
close the facility”.
One area of further learning that needs to be addressed (that it has to be said 
did not particularly present itself in the survey conducted from this report, 
but is evident from conversation and the experience of AELP in talking to 
its members) is the issue of mental health of staff and learners alike. The 
concept of mental health issues has of course long been recognised as force 
acting on the capacity of a learner to engage in learning, but the experience 
of lockdown and the containment of individuals in sometimes chaotic home 
settings in particular has manifested itself in a much-enhanced awareness of 
the effect of this on their whole ability to learn and train. Lockdown appears 
to have conjoined the issues of mental health and learning ability much more 
closely in the minds of some sector leaders than was the case beforehand 
when they were sometimes treated as overlapping but largely “separate” 
issues. 
To expand on this, contracting a medical ailment like a cold or flu may stop 
someone from learning for a short while as they take to their bed, but 
eventually they would resume from the point they left off, and it seems that 
mental health was often regarded in much the same sort of way. It seems 
that lockdown has altered this somewhat – that mental health is increasingly 
being seen as potentially altering the whole ability of someone to learn, and 
to recall what they have previously learnt. That is therefore of fundamental 
interest to the sector, and leaders need to therefore be much more aware 
of this subject and how it can impact on the delivery of their products and 
services in future.
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In general, the experience of lockdown and how the sector reacted to it tends 
to reflect well on the innate “leaderhood” of the sector’s supply side – what 
Silver (2020b) has described as
“a kind of far-sighted sensitivity to the here-and-now 
challenges faced by your community that transcends the 
task-oriented activity … (and) conveys a deep sense both of 
relatedness and of open-ended, future-focused concern.”
What is less clear is whether this leaderhood stemmed from a deliberate sense 
of purpose – that the decisions were being made with a clear line of sight to 
the future and of the welfare of the community as a whole, or whether the 
effect was almost an incidental (perhaps even accidental) derivative of the 
circumstances in which everyone found themselves, on the basis of decisions 
that virtually made themselves. In speaking to sector leaders, it does seem 
anecdotally that many put themselves under immense pressure not just 
to make the right decisions in the moment, but with an eye to how those 
decisions would play out in future. Others however expressed the view that 
the need (for example) to move to online learning was obvious, immediate 
and unavoidable, and therefore even if it had been contrary to long-term 
interests they may well have been forced to make the same decisions anyway.
Either interpretation is in a way positive. One way or the other, leaderhood 
was felt to have manifested itself when the need for it was at its greatest – 
in one sense through positive, deliberate, considered rounded and decisive 
leadership, and through the other incidentally, by leaders not standing in 
the way of what needed to be done in the best interests of learners and the 
community as a whole, just for the sake of having done so. 
Either way, what the pandemic appears to have done is to have manifested 
and/or articulated a clear sense of what leaderhood is beyond the abstract 
concept of it. By giving it form in this way, the sector may be better able  to 
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examine it more closely and see how it can be applied and improved in future 
- what remains to be seen is whether they will do so, or whether the various 
winds of everyday business and political change somehow prevent this from 
being undertaken in the depth it perhaps deserves.
Leaderhood cannot however be a one-way street, with lots of it on one side 
of a relationship but none on the other. If it is called for anywhere, it must 
surely be called for within the fabric of the  civil service; that body of people 
charged with devising and implementing structures of British life that, even if 
they do not sustain for decades in their own right, will have resonance down 
the ages long after their own times. What would now be interesting to look 
at to what extent this demonstration of leaderhood within the supply side is 
reciprocated within government and its agencies. We do not really know how 
corresponding individuals within the civil service perceived the actions or the 
responses of the sector to the communications, instructions, guidance and 
regulation they were putting out; nor what they hoped, planned or felt would 
be the outcomes of those; nor whether they were pleased, disappointed or 
ambivalent about how those communications were met and/or implemented. 
Until we know that, and until we have a clear picture of to what extent, if at 
all, those organisations and the people within them react to the lessons they 
learnt about their own leadership, it will be difficult to form a complete view 
of how the experience of lockdown will have changed things, if at all.
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7. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE 
EXPERIENCE OF LOCKDOWN?
In our introduction, we posed four questions we wanted to examine further 
with reference to our survey, of talking to sector leaders, and of reading the 
various announcements and commentaries that made their way into the 
public arena over the period of lockdown and afterwards.
1 Did the experience change the nature of the relationship 
between the government, its agencies, and the sector? 
The answer here appears to be “not fundamentally”. Ofsted clearly rate very 
well amongst the sector and they did so before, during and after lockdown, and 
there is no serious expectation that anything will change going forward (and 
certainly not for the worse). It appears that the pre-lockdown views of DfE, 
IfATE and ESFA were also not significantly impacted. Sector leaders seemed to 
hold the view that each organisation behaved more or less as they might be 
expected to, with no damascene conversion of enhanced collaboration and 
trust suddenly becoming evident as a result of the emergency circumstances.
This is a little unfortunate, because the need for unity across the country, 
let alone the sector, was key to seeing the period of lockdown through. It is 
generally understood that crises can catalyse significant change and there 
was some hope amongst leaders that perhaps the need to allow the sector to 
make its own decisions and take its own actions – and the fact that it did so 
largely very effectively – might have a beneficial effect on how the sector is 
regulated and managed in future. Indeed, if we are to be very honest, it may 
have been what we were hoping to see some evidence of in the responses we 
received, and in posing the questions in the first place. It may yet be the case 
of course – there seems to be a long way to go before the pandemic plays 
out - but if so, it does not seem that sector leaders are currently particularly 
confident that it will indeed happen.
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2 Did the government’s response – or lack of it – affect 
how their authority is viewed in a post-corona world?
Broadly government and regulators reacted and behaved more or less 
how everyone expected them to react and behave. This does reflect some 
inherent stability in the system - even if it is not the sort of stability that is in 
all cases welcomed, there is something to be said in times of emergency for 
institutions to live up to expectations.
Ofsted’s performance during the pandemic is an extreme example of this. 
Whilst they lived up to expectations, it was slightly surprising to see such 
an overwhelmingly positive reaction from respondents. This could of course 
have been because the suspension of inspections gave everyone one less and 
very major thing to worry about in the course of lockdown, for which sector 
leaders were suitably grateful. It does however appear to constitute more 
than that – the view of Ofsted was positive even before lockdown and they 
consolidated that further. The default reaction to being inspected may be one 
of apprehension, but sector leaders were clear to us that the contribution 
Ofsted make, how they go about their tasks, how they undertake their duties, 
is actually appreciated and serves overall to make learning provider businesses 
better. It was felt that inspectors already understood the challenges that the 
sector faced (probably because so many of them come from a practitioner 
background themselves) and that this translated effectively into how the 
organisation responded in the midst of the crisis. With this in mind, it becomes 
even more noticeable that respondent comments on the other organisations 
often tended to refer to their distance from ground-level reality. It is difficult 
therefore to get a sense of leaderhood  - the sense of decisions being taken 
with eyes on both the community context and the future – from organisations 
that are perceived as not really understanding the present context of the 
sectors they are being given responsibility for, let alone how it may play out 
going forward.
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There is a different, and political, aspect to this question of the effect of the 
lockdown on government authority that we did not explore in this report but 
may yet have a bearing on how the crisis affects the sector going forward - 
to what extent did the political leadership of the country who sit in authority 
above these departments affect their own standing? That is a much broader 
question of course – one that will play out in a much longer timescale and will 
ultimately probably only be fully answered in the heat of a general election.
3 What implications might the sudden shift to widescale 
online learning and remote working have to the way 
further education is thought about and delivered once 
the emergency abates?
 
A clear theme that emerged here was that many in the sector found that they 
were not as far down the path of being ready for online and distance learning 
as they had thought; or at least, that there was further to go to make it a 
viable working proposition than they had appreciated. Plans for implementing 
remote learning were brought forward at an incredibly fast rate because 
there was no choice except to do so. Some sector leaders seemed to express 
mild surprise at the organisational benefits that rapidly accrued from this, 
with some admitting they had not really given enough thought previously to 
the subject, and leading them to ask (or even berate) themselves as to why 
this was the case. 
There are clearly a good deal of issues still to overcome – whilst remote 
learning can bring about cost-savings in travel and efficiency of performance 
by potentially allowing for greater caseloads, this has to be offset by the fact 
that many learners – and in particular those with learning difficulties or special 
needs – miss the interaction of personal contact in learning exchanges, and 
this is very difficult to replicate in an online forum. Practical training is also 
an obstacle, and much thought needs to be given to how this can be best 
accommodated – the rise of augmented reality for example may have a part 
to play in this respect.
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A number of respondents we talked to however noted approvingly of the 
opportunities that the move to online learning had brought about, and whilst 
relatively few indicated that going forward their offer would remain primarily 
virtual, almost all indicated that to one extent or another blended learning 
would play a much greater part than before because it was clear that the 
choice of learning styles and learning delivery it opens up is appreciated by 
both learners and staff alike.
That being the case, there is a clear need for the authorities to take this 
into account as they think forward about how the sector develops in the 
years to come. Paper-based and purely exam-based learning methodologies 
are unlikely to serve the learning population well having been through 
the experience they have just been through, nor are they likely to remain 
acceptable to a cohort of young people whose prospects were disrupted by 
a somewhat ham-fisted attempt to simulate the results of exams that never 
took place. A movement towards higher proportions of coursework, remote 
invigilation, or centre-assessed grades will all require a greater sense of trust 
being engendered between the authorities and the sector. The sector clearly 
feel they have earned this, and that the authorities pay too much attention 
to the few bad apples – referencing a provider who said that “rules are put 
in place to manage the 1% of providers who don’t do the right thing, not get 
the best out of the 99%” – but the authorities may counter that this is true for 
life as a whole. What leaders on both sides need to appreciate is the differing 
dynamics at play in the contexts of the decisions that are being made – the 
sector (and in particular independents) are trying to deliver effective training 
in the context of a fast-moving and volatile commercial market, whilst the 
government is trying do so using taxpayer’s money in the full glare of public 
opinion. There is a gap between these two contexts that was evident at the 
beginning of the crisis and remains evident now, but if the lockdown was to 
teach us all anything, it should have highlighted the need to close this gap 
and align the two dynamics as far as possible. 
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4 What thinking needs to be undertaken in terms of 
contingency planning against any future emergency of 
this nature?
In terms of operational planning, there does not appear to be a feeling that 
much worse could happen than that which dropped on the sector at end of 
March 2020 with the almost complete closure of the economy and effective 
house arrest of much of the population. The pressure to adapt and react 
to this at the time was immense but sector leaders feel that on the whole 
they did the right things, acknowledging the role of trade bodies in providing 
support, guidance and an articulation of their views and positions as they did 
so.
There is however work that needs to be undertaken more widely on 
implementing effective blended learning, as lockdown highlighted a number 
of shortcomings that leaders must continue to address if the sector is to get 
the best from this emerging technology, both on a “steady state” basis and in 
times of crisis such as that just experienced:
	» The unreadiness of some staff to work with the technology
	» The effect of a lack of personal human contact on motivation and 
engagement
	» The difficulty of replicating practical elements of learning on a remote 
basis
	» The extent of digital deficits amongst learners in terms of connectivity, 
hardware and software
Our study therefore leads us to draw the following conclusions:
	» The further education and skills sector was not as prepared for the shift 
to online learning as it had assumed it was
	» That nevertheless it took huge steps to mitigate and these deficiencies 
quickly and effectively wherever it could
	» That the relative lack of trust in the supply side that it felt had been 
demonstrated previously by most agencies of government threatened 
to – but ultimately did not – hold back the ability of the sector to make 
these changes
	» Some residual suspicion remains amongst sector leaders that however 
much they feel they have reacted well and learnt from the experience, 
this will not positively affect the way the sector is governed and 
regulated from above in the future. 
	» In this respect, DfE and IfATE are felt to have much to learn from the 
actions and response of Ofsted – whilst ESFA appears to have been 
viewed as (to some extent) “apparatchiks”, functionaries of their political 
masters and therefore inevitably bound to reflect the weaknesses of 
their leadership. 
This in turn leads us to some broad recommendations:
1 There is an opportunity for the sector to learn much 
more about itself by properly examining the application 
of leaderhood during lockdown – but for this to have 
benefits across the economy as a whole, government 
and the civil service must be prepared to do likewise. 
Both sides must be honest enough acknowledge any 
shortcomings they may identify as a result, and both 
sides must commit to acting to remedy these in a 
constructive and collaborative fashion.
2 Actions speak louder than words. There is little doubt 
that the sector and its leaders on the whole responded 
well to the lockdown, and this demonstration of ability, 
capacity and leaderhood should be reflected in a shift 
in the perception of the government and its regulators 
towards the sector. Whilst rules will always be to 
manage the 1% who do not do the right thing, there 
should be a better appreciation of the impact of these 
rules on the ability of the 99% who try to do so. It is that 
which appears to be missing in the current relationship 
between the sector and government, which should 
take much more active steps to better understand the 
challenges  that the training infrastructure faces.
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3 The role of mental health in learning and recall needs 
to be better understood by sector practitioners. There 
appears to be a greater acknowledgement of the 
evidence of a detrimental effect on learners more than 
was the case before lockdown, but some sector leaders 
are now beginning to see that it is not purely an outside 
force acting on the functioning of learning and recall. It 
can in fact be a much more fundamental component of 
an individual’s ability to learn and recall at all.
4 Sector leaders have acknowledged the deficit in their 
own understanding of the challenges and benefits of 
introducing remote learning technologies. They have 
understood that they, their staff and their organisations 
were in many cases simply not at the level they had 
thought themselves to be at when the pandemic struck. 
On the basis that leaders have now been forced to see 
a rounded vision under duress of what technology can 
do, and that technological advance is not likely to go 
backwards, there is a strong need for the sector to 
move forward and embrace the challenge more fully by 
understanding the technology  better, absorbing and 
utilising it in their delivery and ensuring that staff and 
learners alike have the basic tools to be able to make it 
work for them. 
5 Government too must do more to recognise this truth 
and work with the sector to ensure that regulation 
and metrics of performance can make technological 
opportunities work to the best advantage of everybody. 
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Clearly the sector has learnt much since March 2020, and the learning is 
probably not over yet. Even as this is being written, large parts of England are 
bracing themselves for what amounts to a second full lockdown as the second 
wave of the pandemic threatens to break on our shores. Nevertheless, we 
have a chance now to assimilate a huge amount of learning from a short 
space of time, building it into the fabric of our businesses and their overall 
earning offer going forward. Not to do so would be a failure of leaderhood in 
itself.
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ANNEX 1: A SURVEY OF SECTOR 
LEADERS
In this we look at the results of our survey of sector leaders to look directly and 
in more detail at how they regarded the various departments and agencies of 
government before, during and after the period of lockdown.
The survey was published on 4th September 2020 and was in field for 
three weeks. It generated a total of 53 responses overwhelmingly from 
Chief Executives, Managing Directors or Directors and Senior Management 
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A. DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION 
(DFE)
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DfE generally trusted stakeholders to do the right thing
DfE responded construc�vely to advice and opinion from
the sector
Changes to policy and/or regula�on were generally
communicated in a �mely fashion.
Policy changes generally seemed to overstate the scale of
the problems they set out to address
Sector's view of DfE prior to pandemic
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
% of respondents
Prior to lockdown, respondents believed DfE to generally have had a 
reasonable degree of trust in stakeholders to “do the right thing”, with 37% 
ambivalent and 39% agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement. 
However, it seems the way they went about their work did not sit so well – 
47% disagreed that DfE responded constructively to the sector’s advice and 
opinions. Additionally, 55% disagreed that policy changes were generally 
communicated in a timely fashion, with the same proportion agreeing that 
changes generally seemed to overstate the scale of the problem.
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They generally trusted providers to do the right thing
They understood the challenges the sector faced
There was a two-way rela�onship with post-16 stakeholders
The intoruc�on of delivery flexibili�es were generally
communicated well
The delivery flexibili�es that were intorduced were generally
�mely and appropriate
They enhanced their authority and standing during lockdown
The financial support packages on offer were appropriate for
the short-term emergency
Sector's view of DfE during lockdown
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
% of respondents
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These findings were exacerbated during lockdown itself – the sector’s 
feeling that DfE trusted them did rise slightly, but over 60% felt that they 
did not understand the challenges that providers now faced, with the same 
proportion disagreeing that there was a 2-way relationship with them. There 
were broadly similar proportions of respondents agreeing and disagreeing 
as to the efficacy of communications surrounding the flexibilities that were 
introduced, though half disagreed that the changes were timely or appropriate, 
or that the financial packages on offer were appropriate – probably a function 
of the high proportion of apprenticeship providers that responded to the 
survey and who had felt short-changed by the 02/20 document, but marked 
nonetheless. 
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They will generally trust stakeholders to do the right thing
The rela�onship with the sector will return to its pre-
pandemic state
They will work more construc�vely with the sector than
before the pandemic
They will have enhanced their authority and standing as a
result of the ac�ons they took during lockdown
Their authority and standing has been compromised by the
ac�ons they took during lockdown
The financial support packages on offer will enable us to
survive in the medium to longer term
Sector's view of the future rela�onship with DfE
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
% of respondents
Respondents were also asked to agree or disagree with statements regarding 
the future of the relationship between the sector and DfE. It was felt that the 
DfE would be slightly more distrustful of stakeholders going forward, with 
a good deal of mixed feelings about whether the relationship might revert 
to its pre-pandemic state – 52% were completely neutral for example on 
whether or not the DfE would be more constructive with them going forward. 
59% disagreed that the DfE’s authority and standing had been enhanced by 
the actions they took during lockdown, and half disagreed that the financial 










Did DfE respond effec�vely to the pandemic and 
lockdown?
Yes To some extent No Don't know
We finally asked  whether DfE had responded effectively to the pandemic 
and lockdown. Exactly half of respondents answered “No” although nearly 
42% felt that they had to at least some extent. In the comments left by 
respondents the issue of trust played quite seriously – one said that “rules 
are put in place to manage the 1% of providers who don’t do the right thing, 
not get the best out of the 99%” whilst there were other criticisms of a “broad 
brush approach” and a disconnect with smaller and more local providers. One 
respondent did however comment that although DfE had initially relied too 
much on existing policies and flexibilities to manage the situation, there was 
“a very definite shift to a more responsive, helpful and realistic approach”.
The general lack of trust issue, and a perceived disconnect with the sector, 
was however reinforced by answers to the question “How (if at all) did 
the controversies surrounding exam results in August 2020 impact on the 
relationship between the sector and government and its agencies?” Whilst 
this situation was not entirely down to DfE, it was clear that the sector as a 
whole did hold them culpable to a large degree. 
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Comments included:
“It confirmed to me that those in government have little idea 
of the real impact of their decision-making ”
“They made a bad situation worse ”  
“It made me wonder what they had got wrong if they got 
something as basic as this wrong ”
One commented that it had “left me with no faith in government”; another 
remarked on the “loss of faith in the qualifications side of apprenticeship 
standards” with another also remarking on the “tremendous harm and loss of 
confidence (which will have) long-term repercussions. Even now, employers 
are saying they don’t trust the outcome when they are looking to recruit 
apprentices.”
In all, DfE were not considered to have been particularly effective during 
the period of lockdown. Their authority and standing, already questioned 
by providers who felt they were not trusted and did not have a particularly 
constructive relationship with them, took a further knock and there is clearly 
little confidence that things will improve going forward.
B. EDUCATION AND SKILLS 
FUNDING AGENCY (ESFA)
According to our respondents, the sector felt a little more comfortable with 
some aspects of the ESFA both before and during the lockdown.
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The delivery flexibili�es that were intorduced were generally
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They enhanced their authority and standing during lockdown
Sector's view of ESFA during lockdown
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
% of respondents
When these results are compared to those for DfE, it is found that although 
ESFA were perceived prior to lockdown to trust providers even less than 
DfE, they did feel the ESFA were slightly more constructive than DfE, and 
slightly better at communicating in a timely fashion (though 44% still saw this 
as an issue). Once again ESFA policy changes were felt by 48% to overstate 
the nature of the problems they set out to address. This correlates with the 
results for DfE and is likely to stem from the fact that ESFA do not change 
policy themselves but enact instructions from DfE.
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Trust figures in ESFA did rise during the period of lockdown, and though 40% felt 
they did not understand provider challenges, this was better than DfE’s result. 
Respondents were fairly evenly split on agreeing with the statement about a 
2-way relationship with stakeholders. The flexibilities that were introduced 
were on balance not felt to have been communicated well (although there 
were low levels of strong agreement/strong disagreement on this question) 
but 55% did not think they were timely or appropriate. Overall, 40% thought 
the ESFA had enhanced its authority and standing during lockdown, which is 
of the same magnitude as those responding to the same question about DfE.
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Going forward there is no significant change anticipated by respondents in the 
relationship with ESFA as a result of lockdown. 47% felt that the relationship 
would return to its prior status, though 33% thought that ESFA will become 
more constructive. Overall, the ESFA’s standing seems to have balanced out 
as unaffected, with strong neutral scores on each statement of around 37%. 
It would appear that on balance, respondents felt that ESFA were basically 
doing what they were told to do by DfE, and largely reacted accordingly. The 
broad correlation with DfE results for the same questions tends to indicate 
that if there were delays or confusion about communication, this was as 











Did ESFA respond effec�vely to the pandemic and 
lockdown?
Yes To some extent No Don't know
On balance, it seems that respondents were slightly more impressed with the 
ESFA’s response to the lockdown than they were with DfE. Nearly two-thirds 
thought they were effective to at least some extent with only 29% actively 
saying that they thought they had been ineffective. 
There was however a strong theme in the comments made about a slowness 
of response from ESFA, specifically to individual queries from stakeholders:
“responses … can take considerable time … contradictory 
answers also demonstrate a lack of understanding of what 
the issue is”
“slow to respond to anything with no-one able to answer or 
give a decision”
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One respondent noted however that:
“in the initial stages of lockdown there was a lack of urgency 
and pace….however as time has passed they have definitely 
become more responsive. … (but) I do think there is a real 
over-optimism about a return to some form of normality. In 
recent days we have been encouraged to get 16-18s back in 
to college and this fails to reflect the very real challenges 
that are now emerging (such as) YPs from households who 
are shielding, students unable to get tested, staff unable 
to get tested etc. … young people are reluctant to travel … 
the extent of the disruption that this will cause across the 
whole sector.”
This however seems to stem from ESFA’s role as a facilitator of government 
policy rather than an instigator – if there are anomalies in the return-to-work 
or return-to-learning policy overall, then this is seen as from government 
itself and not its agencies.
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On balance the sector did not have a particularly positive view of IfATE 
prior to the pandemic. Although three of the four questions were framed 
positively, there was a good deal of disagreement with them, with 43% 
feeling that IfATE did not trust stakeholders, 61% feeling they did not respond 
constructively to the sector and 47% feeling they were not timely in their 
policy announcements. However, the remaining question - on whether rule 
changes generally seemed to overstate the scale of the problems they set 
out to address – was more negatively framed but provoked a high neutral 
score of over 56% (though even here nearly 38% actively disagreed with the 
proposition). 
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IfATE’s trust in its stakeholders was generally perceived to have improved 
during lockdown, as did its understanding of the challenges that they faced. 
However only 13% thought there was a two-way relationship and 38% did 
not agree that delivery flexibilities were well communicated – over half (52%) 
did not think the flexibilities offered were timely or appropriate and only 25% 
thought they enhanced their authority and standing in this period.
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ac�ons they took during lockdown
Their authority and standing has been compromised by the ac�ons
they took during lockdown
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Most average scores for IfATE have been enhanced over the period of the 
pandemic, which follows through into results for how the sector may perceive 
them going forward. The average score for trust, constructiveness and the 
timeliness of their actions all rose. Despite this however the sector seems to 
retain a slightly jaundiced view of IfATE overall, with more respondents than 










Did IfATE respond effec�vely to the pandemic and 
lockdown?
Yes To some extent No Don't know
This was reflected in responses to the question as to whether or not IfATE 
had responded effectively during lockdown: the proportion answering “to 
some extent” was the single biggest group, but the proportion answering 
“no” was of the same broad magnitude. This may be a reflection of the 
slightly fractious relationship that IfATE had with the sector in their early days 
of existence; even though the actions they took in the pandemic met with 
general approval there is a feeling coming through from these results that the 
sector feels IfATE may well eventually return to “business as usual” with nearly 
half (48%) thinking the relationship would return to its pre-pandemic state. 
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When taken with the previous results seems to indicate some grudging 
acknowledgement by the sector that the actions taken by IfATE were at least 
generally appropriate, but that the strains in their previous relationship with 
them would not be necessarily easily forgotten.
“ Slow and reactive communications (from IfATE) have caused 
disillusion when more positive action and guidance was 
required. While it was appreciated that the circumstances 
were unprecedented and approval was required from 
others, a greater sense of understanding and leadership 
would have been appreciated.”
Executive Director, independent training provider
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D. OFSTED
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According to respondents, Ofsted were clearly held in considerable regard 
prior to the pandemic, with very strong positive scores on trust, their 
constructive approach and timeliness of communications.
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This followed through during the period of lockdown, with respondents 
to the question on trust  merely shifting to “strongly agree” rather 
than “agree” in indicating a total of 72% agreement.   
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80% of respondents felt Ofsted understood the challenges they faced, 64% 
felt it was a good 2-way relationship and 79% thought Ofsted’s pandemic 
communications were timely. Overall, 76% thought they had enhanced their 
authority and standing over this period. 
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The trust issue was maintained once again when respondents were asked about 
the future relationship with Ofsted, with 66% saying they felt the relationship 
would return to its pre-pandemic state. Two-thirds of respondents thought 
Ofsted would improve the constructive approach to the sector and 56% say 










Did Ofsted respond effec�vely to the pandemic and 
lockdown?
Yes To some extent No Don't know
This translates into an overwhelmingly positive summation of Ofsted’s 
effectiveness during the pandemic, with 87% agreeing they had responded 
effectively to at least some extent, and nearly 70% believing they had done 
so completely. One respondent said that “Ofsted were proactive and decisive 
and engendered greater confidence” – another said that “Ofsted understand 
providers and delivery far more than the ESFA or IfATE, both of whom are 
staffed with people with little or no experience of working with employers, 
their staff and individual learners. That’s why Ofsted understood the issues 
created by the pandemic and the others (whilst) DFE , IfATE and ESFA took far 
too long to take any action.”
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